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This paper estimates and describes how a shock that increases an individual’s do-
nation to one cause tends to displace her gifts to other charitable causes, an effect I
call “expenditure substitution.” I use the 2001-2005 waves of the PSID/COPPS, the
first data set of its kind. Households that give more to one type of charity tend to
give more to others. However, many of the correlations between the residuals after
fixed-effects regressions are negative and significant, particularly for larger donors and
for certain categories of charitable giving. Given plausible econometric assumptions,
the negative correlations are strong evidence of expenditure substitution.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
On average Americans give about 2% of their income to charity, with about 60% of this going
to religious organizations. In a typical year about 70% of households make contributions
and fundraising expenses are around $2 billion (Andreoni, 2006). Empirical economists have
typically focused on two major issues: the “crowding out” of government grants and the
impact of different tax regimes on overall giving. Little academic work has been written
about the extent to which an individual’s contribution to one cause comes at the expense of
her other philanthropy. This issue has come to the attention of policymakers and journalists
in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,1 and again after the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami2 and 2005’s Hurricane Katrina3 – in each case there was a concern that
the flood of donations to the well-publicized cause would dampen giving to other charities.
However, some have dismissed this concern, claiming that “donor fatigue” is a myth.4 I
address this issue here, examining within-household conditional correlations to measure and
describe the extent to which one charitable donation displaces another.
What do I mean by “substitution between charitable donations”? Since I do not observe
independent price variation,5 I cannot measure cross-price elasticities. I model donation
decisions (modeling details in appendix) as sequential but occurring in a random order and
assume that there is temporary “shock” to utility at the time some decisions are made. For
example, a household may experience a powerful appeal from a charitable organization, or
a prominent natural disaster may raise the perceived efficacy of some donations. I consider
the effect of these shocks to be “preallocations”(as in the terminology of Pollak (1969)) away
from the donation that maximizes the un-shocked utility. I aim to measure the “expendi-
1http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/04/911/Sept 11 donations swa.shtml
2http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/07/30/africa.hungry.ap/index.html
3“Katrina Giving Cuts Donations To Other Groups; As Relief Contributions Pour In, Unrelated Charities
Retool Plans To Get Back on Donors’ Minds” – The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2005.
In response, the government increased the maximum allowable tax deduction for charitable giving to 100
percent of income on donations made during the last part of 2005. – “Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act...,”
by Candace Clark, UNC-Chapel Hill. http://www.johnbrownlimited.com/newsletter/1005/index.cfm
4“Many Dismissing ‘Donor Fatigue’ as Myth”– New York Times, April 30, 2006
5Generally all charities are treated equally for US federal and state taxes.
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ture substitution” (or “expenditure complementarity”): the response, in dollars given to one
category of charity, to the preallocated expenditure on another category of charitable gift.
Given the rich panel nature of my data, I can control both for the household’s long-term
propensity to donate to each category of charity and for observables that vary over time.
The remaining variation is assumed to have two components. The first is assumed to be
an exogenous “true shock” that is orthogonal to all other stochastic variables. The second
includes both the effect of omitted or mismeasured variables (in particular, income) and the
effect of permanent changes in the utility function (in particular, changes in generosity and
altruism). Taken collectively, this second component of variation is assumed to be positively
correlated across charities.
Since I do not observe the order of the donation decisions, I do not estimate a regression
model. Instead, I focus on the correlation coefficients between the residuals (from separate re-
gressions with household-dummies and controls) of giving to each category of charity. Given
my stochastic assumptions, although a positive correlation coefficient does not necessarily
imply complementarity, a negative coefficient does imply “expenditure substitution” (defined
in section 2). Even without these modeling assumptions, the results are descriptively useful:
they represent the first empirical evidence on an individual’s substitution between charitable
causes in a panel setting.6
The various theoretical models of charitable giving imply different substitution patterns.
According to a “pure public goods” model (Becker, 1974) there should be virtually no ex-
penditure substitution between unrelated charities. On the other hand, in the “warm-glow
model” (Andreoni, 1990), if charity is a homogeneous good, when an individual increases
her gift to one charity she will reduce giving to all other charities by the same amount.
A “tithing model” (e.g., Laffont and Martimort (2002)) also predicts “perfect” (100%)
6While an instrumental variables approach might be preferable, no strongly significant and plausibly
exogenous instrument could be found, although I tried all of the obvious and recommended possibilities
(as well as some wild stabs). In a previous version of this paper I used the year of a college reunion as
an instrument for giving to education, but on a careful reexamination this instrument proved not highly
significant, possibly because of data limitations that made precise identification of the year of bachelor’s
degree impossible in some cases.
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crowding-out. A warm-glow model in which different charities are distinct components of
the utility function can yield virtually any result, as can an impact model (Duncan, 2004).
The “Kantian” model predicts a moderate amount of expenditure substitution, but little
substitution between distinct categories of charity.
My results are also relevant to the empirical issues that have been a focus of the literature.
If there is expenditure substitution and a government grant crowds out giving to one cause,
donors may increase their giving to other charities, as noted by Feldstein and Taylor (1976).
Furthermore, substitution among charities will complicate estimation (as in Reece (1979)
and Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976)) of the price and income elasticities of each charity.
A precise measure of expenditure substitution will be useful to policymakers, charities,
volunteers, and philanthropists. Tax incentives may have unintended consequences: if the
government offers favorable treatment to one charity, this may decrease contributions to other
charities. Substitution is also important to fiscal planning: policymakers need to gauge how
much an unexpected disaster or predictable change in giving patterns will impact other char-
ities and create a need for greater public funding.7 They also may want to know the net
effect of such a disaster on tax revenues, as more charitable giving means more tax deduc-
tions; substitution will dampen this effect. An altruistic nonprofit executive (or individual
soliciting donations) might be concerned that increases in giving to his cause may displace
contributions to other charities; failure to recognize this could lead to overinvestment in
fundraising as discussed by Chua and Ming Wong (2003) and Straub (2003). Finally, if a
community institution that offers services to its members (such as a church, library, or opera
house) seeks donations rather than relying on membership fees, this may reduce giving to
other charities that the institution’s leaders care about.
The key results of this paper come from a micro-econometric analysis of individual sub-
stitution patterns in the 2001, 2003, and 2005 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), in conjunction with the Center on Philanthropy Panel Survey (COPPS). This is the
7It is widely accepted that, particularly in the US, private philanthropy often substitutes for public sector
provision of goods and services. See, e.g., Hungerman (2005).
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first large-scale US data set that includes reliable repeated observations of individuals’ giving
to several major categories of charities.8 Thus, I can control for individual-fixed attributes as
well as time-varying financial variables, and I limit the sample to households with constant
demographic characteristics.
Examining correlations between residuals from fixed-effect regressions (or from simple
differences from household-level means), I find a strongly significant negative relationship
between contributions to health and contributions to basic needs (henceforth, “Needy”)
charities, but a positive relationship between Needy and combined-cause charities. While
these are robust to various checks, the patterns for other charity pairings are more mixed.
Aggregating across categories, I find several other negative relationships; e.g., between reli-
gious and non-religious gifts. Overall, there is a greater level of substitution for the larger
givers than for those who give smaller amounts. The substitution does not tend to occur
at the extensive margin: a household that stops (starts) giving to one category tends to
stop (start) giving to another category more often then the reverse. Insofar as my results
show substitution they are broadly consistent with the results of my laboratory experiments
(Reinstein, 2008).
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I define and discuss this paper’s goal:
estimating “expenditure substitution.” In section 3 I survey the economic literature on giv-
ing and related topics. I first discuss what previous models would predict for expenditure
substitution. Next I review key findings on variables that influence giving, and then discuss
empirical work on substitution among endogenous choices. I found no papers that tackle sub-
stitution in charitable giving at the individual level. Section 4 describes the PSID/COPPS
data and presents summary statistics. Section 5 presents and interprets the overall econo-
metric results. I conclude in section 6.
8Other data sources include the Consumer Expenditure Survey, which does not have a robust panel
dimension, and income-tax data, which does not differentiate by charitable cause.
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2 Conceptual model
Americans have donated more than $1 billion to the [Katrina/ flooding] relief
... But the largess is starting to come at the expense of charities with other
missions. ...The challenge is people like Betty and Larry Sullivan .... the couple
has given $4,000 for the tsunami relief effort and some $35,000 to help Hurri-
cane Katrina survivors ... As for donations to other charities this year, “That’s
history,” says Mrs. Sullivan.9
Economists typically frame demand, including demand for making charitable gifts, as
a simultaneous decision to purchase a bundle of goods and services to maximize a utility
function subject to a budget constraint. In this framework, parameters that affect the
utility function (e.g., good weather) and the budget constraint (income and prices) are
said to impact all of the consumption choices – these exogenous parameters are not seen
as specific to any good. Economists will estimate price elasticities, but to ask “how does
consumption of A affect consumption of B?” is not meaningful. We cannot assert causality
for such simultaneous decisions, and the ratios of changes in these choices will depend on
what is causing the changes.10 However, as in the quote above, non-economists often pose
this question, frequently see their decisions as sequential, and conceive of one purchase
coming at the expense of another. Furthermore, in the standard economic framework it is
not meaningful to claim that an event such as a tsunami has a direct impact only on gifts to
one cause. A shock “µKit ” can be specific in the sense that it only changes the marginal utility
of gifts to one cause, but if decisions are simultaneous, the shock will affect all choices.
To reconcile these distinct views and give a conceptual and econometric framework for
my analysis, I offer a model of sequential decision-making with temporary shocks. As this
model does not yield any crucial theoretical results, I present it in more detail, along with
9The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2005.
10Still, our standard economic examples suggest a more direct causation: coffee “substitutes for” tea, while
cream “complements” both beverages.
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its implications for my econometric identification, in the appendix. In brief, I define “ex-
penditure substitution” (essentially, the change in the expenditure on one good when the
consumption of another good is exogenously moved from its long-term optimum) in terms of
the cross-derivative of Pollak’s (1969) conditional demand. The key restriction on the shock
term essentially rules out the possibility that variations that cause increased giving to one
category of charity inherently tend to coincide with variations that cause decreased giving
to another category. Under the conditions given I show that where I estimate a negative and
significant Pearson correlation coefficient (between residuals from fixed-effects regressions of
giving to two distinct charitable causes), I can infer that there is a high probability that
these charities are expenditure substitutes.
3 Previous Work
There are several competing theoretical models of giving. Since these predict different pat-
terns of expenditure substitution, as described below, my empirical results can be used to
evaluate these theories.11
Table 4 about here
Assume people do not have diminishing returns to giving to a single cause, and only care
about the total amount that a specific cause receives. Under this model small to medium-
sized donors should only give to a single large charity – an individual’s small contribution
will not significantly help a large charity, and thus should not change the ordering (between
charities) of the marginal utility to marginal cost ratio in the individual’s decision problem.12
Similarly, any small shock to (own or others’) giving to a charity should leave this ordering
unchanged. Thus, for typical small givers to big charities, there should be no expenditure
11See appendix list 1 for a formalization of the models discussed below as well as other possibilities. Note
that I do not attempt to separate income and substitution effects in my empirical analysis: I leave this for
later research. For more complete surveys of the literature, see Andreoni (2006) and Bekkers and Wiepking
(2008).
12A similar argument is made by Sugden (1983), among others.
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substitution between dissimilar charities (net of income effects, which could cause a small
amount of substitution).
Warm glow model (Andreoni, 1990)
If there is only a warm glow motivation (the individual gets a positive feeling from do-
nating) and the charitable causes are perfect substitutes (i.e., contribute equally to marginal
utility for all levels of giving) as sources of warm glow, then her warm glow will be a func-
tion of the total amount donated. This implies complete crowding-out: if she is induced to
give a dollar more to charity A then she will reduce contributions to all other charities by
one dollar. In a more sophisticated warm glow model (perhaps motivated in part by public
recognition), the individual’s warm glow may be a concave function of her gifts to a set of
charities, with diminishing returns to the gift to each charity, implying a certain degree of
substitution. In this model virtually any level of substitution or complementarity is possible,
depending on the extent to which these charities are complements or substitutes in providing
warm glow.
Impact Philanthropy (Duncan, 2004)
Duncan’s model of “impact philanthropy” can be seen as a refinement of Andreoni’s
model, where the warm glow comes from the donor’s perception of her gifts’ impact on the
recipients. Duncan assumes marginal utility diminishes in this impact-driven warm glow. As
in the public goods case, small to moderate gifts should not affect the perceived marginal
impact of other gifts. Thus, under this model expenditure substitution should depend on
how the much impact the donor thinks the “shocked” gift had. This model should yield an
intermediate prediction for expenditure crowd-out. If the shock is perceived to have had no
impact at all, it will have no crowding-out effect (net of income effects). If the shock is seen
to have as much impact as the gifts the donor otherwise would have given, crowding out will
be complete.
Kantian/ individual-group misperception
In this model (mentioned in (Sugden, 1983), formalized in list 1 in the appendix here)
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the individual makes decisions such that if all others mirrored her, her utility (perhaps
altruistic/enlightened) would be maximized. Such an individual will allocate her own charity
as a fraction of what she would see as optimal if she were the social planner. Here, net
substitution should be large between charities that accomplish the same or similar goals, but
small to nonexistent if two causes are vastly different; the pattern depends on the extent
to which these charities (considered as public goods) are complements or substitutes in the
individual’s utility function.
Empirical literature
Previous authors offer evidence on the major determinants of charitable giving, some of
which could be seen as “shocks” that specifically shift an individual’s gift to one type of
charity. An obvious example of a shock is a natural disaster. The Center on Philanthropy
at Indiana University (CPIU) noted that for 10 of 13 “major events of terrorism, war (or
war-like) acts, and political or economic crises” giving grew at a faster rate in the calendar
year after these events than it did in the year of, or the year before the event.13 In a separate
paper, the CPIU surveyed 1,304 adults about their household’s philanthropic behavior after
the events of September 11, 2001, finding high rates of giving and participation (around
74%). However, surveys of charities do not seem to show a large overall “crowding out”
effect of this giving.14 An individuals’ exposure to campaigns and events such as the Aids
Ride, the Jerry Lewis Telethon, and Save the Children television spots, as well as the timing
and attractiveness of those making face-to-face solicitations will vary from year to year.15
Many authors find that “peer group” effects and other social influences are significant.16
13AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy Press Release, Sept 20, 2001 “Update; What do Crises Mean for Giving?”
14“Most charities say the September 11 terrorist attacks were not a major damper on year-end fundraising,
according to a survey by the Association of Fundraising Professionals” (Chronicle of Philanthropy, Feb 21,
2002, p. 25). However, these reports do not carefully consider the counterfactual: giving to certain causes
might have been even higher if not for the 9/11 giving.
15Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (2005) report that an “increase in female solicitor physical attrac-
tiveness” had a large positive effect on contributions. However, Van Diepen, Donkers, and Franses (2006)
show that excessive promotion may lead to irritation and actually reduce giving.
16E.g., Long (1976), Keating, Pitts, and Appel (1981), Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976), Schervish and
Havens (1998), Carman (2003), and Martin and Randall (2008).
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Government policy may also be an important influence on giving. If the government were
to offer a special tax concession for gifts to one cause, or were to take away charitable status
to certain groups (e.g., to charities suspected of funding terrorism), this could yield a specific
shock. In fact, some nations, including Germany, Italy, France, Australia, and Japan do have
different deduction rules for different categories of charity,17 and at least one member of the
U.S. Congress has questioned whether all charities deserve equal tax breaks.18
Many economists have attempted to estimate the (after-tax) price elasticity of charitable
giving.19 Depicting charity as a composite good, nearly all studies found a significant and
negative effect, but these studies disagree as to whether elasticity exceeds one.20 Some au-
thors have differentiated these estimates by category of charitable cause: Reece (1979) found
a wide variation in price elasticities between charities, ranging from -0.077 for educational
giving to -1.598 for religious giving, while Feldstein and Taylor (1976) found price elasticities
greater than one for all categories except religious contributions. Economists have also ex-
amined whether government spending crowds out private giving. While this “crowding-out”
is distinct from the one I discuss, if giving is motivated by the public goods model, the two
types of crowding out will be equivalent, since such an individual has preferences only over
the total amount a cause receives. Most empirical accounts show reverse or no crowding-out
(Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995); Okten and Weisbrod (2000); and Straub (2003)),
while Payne (1998) finds a 50% rate of crowding out.21
The most common empirical models regress the log of contributions against the log of
income, the log of the price of gifts (defined as one minus the household’s marginal tax
rate on contributions), and demographic variables such as age, marital status, education,
17Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
18“What Is Charity?,” by Stephanie Strom, The New York Times, November 14, 2005.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/giving/14strom.html
19E.g., Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976); Feldstein and Taylor (1976); Lankford and Wyckoff (1991); Ran-
dolph (1995); Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002)); Reece (1979); Feldstein (1975).
20A price elasticity above one is typically seen as a necessary condition to justify the treasury-efficiency of
the tax deduction.
21In contrast, several laboratory experiments ((Andreoni, 1993); (Bolton and Katok, 1998); and (Eckel,
Grossman, and Johnston, 2005)) find significant crowding-out.
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and religion or church attendance. Giving tends to be U-shaped as a percent of income
(Andreoni, 2006), and the less wealthy give a much larger share to religious institutions
(Katzev, 1995).
Economists have not directly addressed the issue of expenditure substitution in charitable
giving. Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz (1996) examined substitution between giving and vol-
unteering, a closely related problem,22 although with more observably distinct prices. Their
structural model allows them to estimate differences driven by the (observed and imputed)
prices of giving and volunteering, and (if their assumptions hold) consistently estimate own
and cross-price elasticities between these two activities. They find that gifts of time and
money are gross complements but net (Hicksian) substitutes, although the cross-price ef-
fects are small. They also find a significant positive correlation between unobservables that
increase the marginal utility of giving time and money, revealing an “unobserved taste for
altruism” that would yield a bias towards complementarity in a naive estimation.
Finally, a few papers have analyzed substitution patterns among “endogenous” choices
that are part of the same optimization problem without independently varying prices (or
other shifters). For example, Montmarquette and Monty (1987) examine household choices
of labor market participation, leisure, and volunteerism, offering a nonstructural analysis of
the relationship between these variables.23 Biddle and Hamermesh (1990) estimate a system
of decisions that Wooldridge (2003) refers to as not “autonomous,” describing “how one
endogenous choice variable trades off against another.” The authors regress hours of sleep
on hours of work, both in cross-sectional, cross-country, and panel fixed effect regressions.
These regressions suffer from the same potential endogeneity and bidirectional causation
as my estimates: sleep, work, and leisure are jointly chosen, and of these only work has
a distinct observable price. They argue that, although they have not strictly established
causality, their results are useful, showing at least some substitution between work and
22This is particularly relevant if these activities yield distinct “warm glow” payoffs in the utility function,
and are thus equivalent to separate charities.
23Still, they do offer an analysis using price in the latter part of their paper.
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sleep. They also claim that their fixed effect methodology controls for one kind of bias from
an individual-specific “need for sleep.”A similar case can be made for the usefullness of the
empirical analysis below, even if the previously mentioned stochastic assumptions do not
hold.24
4 Data Description, Data Issues, Created Variables
While many studies collect information on charitable giving, the PSID/COPPS is the only
U.S. survey that reliably observes giving in a repeated, multi-year (biennial) panel setting.
Starting in 2001 the PSID/COPPS survey asks each household a series of question about how
much they gave to specific categories of charity in the previous year. They collect the most
detailed data (whether contributed, amount contributed, including gifts of money, assets, or
property) for the following six categories: Religion – “towards religious purposes”; Combi-
nation –“towards combined purpose funds”; Needy –to “organizations that help people in
need of basic necessities”; Health – “towards health care or medical research organizations”;
Education – “towards educational purposes... colleges, grade schools, PTA’s, libraries, or
scholarship funds”; and Other.25
As discussed above, the after-tax price of giving is seen as a key factor in the giving
decision. However, the decision to itemize deductions is not fully exogenous, as it is par-
tially determined by an individual’s giving. Because of this, most studies “employ a sample
of taxpayers who itemize their returns and would do so even without the deduction for
charitable contributions” (Lankford and Wyckoff, 1991). To deal with this, I compute the
expected itemization status and the expected (average) after-tax price of giving, both using a
24For completeness, I note that the past year has brought some unpublished and preliminary work dealing
with similar issues as the present paper. Diepen et al (2009) offer some field experimental evidence on the
crowding-out effects of direct mail solicitations. Borgloh (2009) is investigating the impact of the German
church tax on households other charitable giving.
25These categories are presented in the same order in every survey; I give more information on the precise
questions asked in the appendix. Since 2002 “other,” is further broken down into: “Youth and family
services,” “Arts, culture, and ethnic awareness,” “Improving neighborhoods or communities,” “Preserving
the environment,” “International aid or world peace”, and “Any other charitable purpose or organization we
did not mention.” I do not focus on the “other” category, and I ignore the subdivisions within this category.
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regression-predicted level of giving. I use NBER’s Taxsim module to compute the marginal
cost of charitable giving – which is one for non-itemizers and one minus the marginal tax
rate for itemizers.26
Regression analyses of charitable giving often remove several types of observations seen as
outliers, unreliable, or irrelevant. Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002) remove those who change
marital status, those with low incomes, dependent filers, and those who itemize but would
not have done so without charitable giving – they claim that these are “standard practices”
in the literature. Several studies remove individuals with low and/or high incomes (e.g.,
Lankford and Wyckoff (1991)).27 Reece (1979) removes giving outliers, as do other authors.
I make similar restrictions. I begin with the “cross-section sample”, the segment of the
PSID that was designed to be nationally representative in 1968. Except where specified, I
remove families with major household composition changes, large changes in total giving in
any year (a change in either direction exceeding 30% of total income), and the largest givers
(over $80,000 or over 30% of income if income above $10,000). Overall, I drop roughly one
third of the households that are present in each of the three years, leaving approximately 3466
household observations per year. I make these removals because I suspect these households
are misreporting. In any case, they do not significantly change the estimates, and at worst
they imply that my estimator is focused on households with more conventional behavior.
Regressions using the log of net income naturally drop the 19 remaining observations where
net income is negative or zero. I give details of these calculations in the appendix, as well
as other data cleaning details. Some key summary statistics are given below.28
Table 5 about here
Table 6 about here
26This is described in the appendix. This endogeneity is not a serious problem here anyway: I am not
trying specifically to estimate the price elasticity of giving.
27The former restriction is mainly relevant to tax data, where only itemizers’ deductions are observed, but
exemptions change over time (see Auten et al., 2002).
28Other summary statistics available by request
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Table 7 about here
The rates of giving in table 6 are close to those reported elsewhere and seems to be fairly
stable in recent years.29 For example, Andreoni (2006) reported a 68.5% rate of giving back
in 1995 using Independent Sector data, and a 48% rate of giving to religious organizations.
Since most households do not give at all to a particular category in a particular year, the
medians (table 7) are mostly zero.30 Average gift conditional on giving are fairly similar
across the categories of giving other than religion, although health-related gifts tend to be
smaller. These figures are also reasonably close to those from other sources; for example,
the Independent Sector reported that the average contributing household gave $1620 in the
year 2000 (my comparable figure for this year is $1877).
5 Results
Table 8 about here
No simple pattern fits all, or even most households. Virtually no households behave in a
manner consistent with perfect crowding-out. As shown in table 8, most households donate
to more than one category of charity, and many donate to several categories (especially
among large givers 31 ). Both large and small givers tend to vary their giving levels from
year to year. Among the 6066 households who gave to charities in all years, the median
year-to-year change in total giving was approximately one third of a household’s average
donation, fewer than 10% of such households changed their giving by less than 10% in a
given year, and only 36 households reported giving the exact same amount in each year.
29These figures come from the binary question, “did you ... make donations”; not all of these respondents
ever reported an amount (nor a range) given, so the conditional-on-positive figures cannot be exactly imputed
from these.
30On the other hand, the median 2000-2004 yearly non-religious donation for the 1999 “large givers”, a
focus of later analysis, is $500; details available by request.
31Further details available by request.
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Median percentage deviations were comparable for larger givers, and higher for nonreligious
giving. 31
Table 9 reports raw correlations among the categories of giving.32 Unsurprisingly, the
amounts a household gives to each of the various categories of charity in a given year are
positively and significantly correlated. The residuals from Poisson regressions of each cat-
egory of charity on income, imputed price, and other standard controls are also nearly all
positively and significantly correlated, although less strongly so – this is shown in table 10.
The results of this regression are given in the appendix, in table 1; errors are clustered by
household. The use of a Poisson regression with a strictly positive non-count dependent
variable with corner solutions is motivated by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). For all of the cor-
relation results given in this paper, the residuals from analogous linear (rather than Poisson)
regressions show the same or similar patterns. 31
Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 about here (or at end) Ideally, if typesetting considerations
permit, all four tables should be aligned in a 2 by 2 matrix on facing pages, allowing easy
visual comparison.
I next examine variation within households, i.e., controlling for a household-specific ef-
fect. Table 11 gives the matrix of correlations between the “de-meaned” (differenced from
household means) gifts to each category.33
To control for time-varying observables such as income and imputed price, I run a
Poisson (psuedo-maximum-likelihood) regression with fixed effects (Hausman et al., 1984;
Wooldridge, 1999), using the command xtpqml in Stata (Simcoe, 2007). Regression results,
given in table 2 in the appendix, suggest price elasticities that are heterogeneous by cat-
egory but below unit elasticity for all categories except education. Net income shows the
correct sign, but all categories of giving appear to be income inelastic. The regression also
32Unless otherwise noted, all correlations are pairwise. Independent p-values are given for all tables;
Bonferroni or Sidak corrected values available by request.
33These are equivalent to the residuals from fixed-effects regressions with no control variables.
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allows trend and year-specific effects through the year variables; these effects are mixed, but
positive where they are significant.
The correlations between the residuals from these regressions (table 12) are similar to the
correlations in de-meaned contributions (table 11)the control variables have little impact on
the within-household results. The signs of these correlations depend on the pairing of the
charity categories. However, comparing these tables to tables 9 and 10 the correlations are,
without exception, lower (more negative) when we control for household-specific effects, in
line with claim 1 (given in the appendix).
Controlling for other charitable gifts (full partial correlation results available by request)
also has virtually no effect on the bivariate coefficients of correlation. Standard ols regres-
sions on the de-meaned variables also lead to similar results; the correlation coefficients are
(naturally) bounded between the coefficients of the forward and reverse regressions, and in
general are roughly halfway between the two.
Table 13 about here
Two results are consistently significant across a wide variety of alternative specifications:
Education and Combined-Cause have a strong positive correlation, while Health and Needy
have a significant negative correlation. This is depicted in table 13. Rows a to g present
the bivariate correlations in the residuals after various fixed-effects regressions, focusing
on various subsets. Rows a and b repeat the results mentioned above. Row c is from
regression with an addition “support for others not in household” control variable (which
may be interpretable as a proxy for generosity). Row d re-includes households that were
classified as giving outliers. Row e drops households that never gave to either charity
in the pair examined.34 Row f focuses on the intensive margin, keeping residuals only for
those households that always gave something to both charities in the pair. Row g examines
households that were “large givers”, declaring over $1000 in total contributions on their
34Even where the household never gave to one of the charities, the regression residuals may be nonzero
because of the predicted effects of time-varying observables. Other correlations are also not sensitive to
omitting these. 31
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1998 tax forms).35 Row h presents partial correlations between the residuals, additionally
controlling for the other categories of charitable giving. All of these results are the same in
sign and are statistically significant. Coefficients are significantly larger in magnitude when
we focus on the intensive margin, and substitution is greater when we focus on the large
givers.
Comparing the overall correlations, the correlations in pooled residuals, and the correla-
tions in within-household residuals, we see that both the household-fixed variables and the
latent household-fixed effects are important, and both appear to have similar effects across
categories of charitable giving. Hence, a pooled cross-sectional analysis is biased towards
finding complementarity; both observable and unobservable components of income, and fac-
tors such as generosity and altruism, tend to push charitable gifts in the same direction.
Table 14 about here
In table 14 I report correlations from the residuals from fixed effects Poisson regressions
with controls between a few key unambiguous categories (and sums of categories) and the
sum of giving to all other charities. 36 e see stronger and more negative correlations (in
first differences) among gifts for large givers (those who gave $1000 or more to some category
in 1998). The “large giver” correlations are more negative for most pairings of charities, as
seen in table 3 in the appendix.
This suggests a heterogenous motivation for giving. For example, those who give a large
amount may have sophisticated warm glow preferences, in which charitable contributions are
imperfect substitutes.37 Thus, when these individuals increase their contribution to one cause
they decrease contributions to other causes. In contrast, small givers may act impulsively
or be largely or entirely motivated by shocks such as specific appeals, perhaps gaining little
35The $1000 cutoff is arbitrary, but other values yield similar results (as seen in table 17). I use the 1998
data here to avoid a potential problem of “regression to the mean.” Pre-2000, the PSID only asks people
the total charitable giving they declared for tax purposes, if they itemized their deductions.
36W
37The data does not suggest that these large givers have a pure “public goods” motivation: for these large
givers, on average (over years 2000-2004), only about 15% of gave to only one major category in a year, and
almost 60% gave to three or more categories.
17
warm glow and attributing little intrinsic value to any charity.38 Here, positive correlations
may stem from a variable that impacts shocks to multiple charities (as implied by assumption
4 in the appendix), e.g., vulnerability to charitable appeals. For example, someone in the
family be staying at home more often or may have taken a job in an office with a culture of
fundraising.
Finally, it is important to differentiate the effect of shocks at the extensive and intensive
margin. According to at least one fundraising insider, “giving is a learned behavior.”39 This
should lead to an expenditure complementarity in giving that should occur at the extensive
margin, leading households to make positive gifts to other charities for the first time. Table
15 focuses on two pairings of charities and tabulates cases where both charities experienced a
“state change” (from zero to positive or positive to zero). Whether we look at the pair that
appear to be substitutes (Needy and Health) or the pair that appear to be complements
(Combined and Education), these state changes are significantly more likely to go in the
same direction then in opposite directions:
Table 15 about here
As further test of the assumptions and as a reference point I examine another major
component of “discretionary” spending: eating out in restaurants.40 Appendix table 16
reports correlations between (residuals of) such expenditure and the various categories of
donations.41 These correlations are almost entirely positive and often significant, in contrast
to the negative relationships in key cells of tables 11 and 12. This lends further support
38As the Mad Hatter might point out, those who were giving nothing to A can give no less to A when a
shock causes them to give more to B. The reason these small givers were giving nothing to A is because they
put a low value on altruism towards A. The reason they respond to the shock and give to B is not because
it gives them warm-glow nor because they care for the public good, but because after the appeal they might
feel cruel or be stigmatized if they do not give.
39According to Steve Thomas, chair and creative director of Canada’s largest direct-response fundraising
firm, “... people giving money to the tsunami appeals who haven’t given to charities before [will] find that
they kind of like the experience, and ... end up giving money to other things....” (TVB, Charities Industry
Report).
40For households in the sample the average yearly expense on restaurants is $2022.
41The first column controls for household-fixed effects as in table 11; the second column also controls for
observables as in tables 2 and 12; details by request.
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to the assumption that unobserved components of disposable income lead to a bias towards
finding expenditure complementarity.
As table 17 demonstrates, the main findings presented are fairly robust; they are not
merely an artifact of a few outlying observations.42 The correlations between (residuals and
demeaned values of) health and needy giving, between health plus educational giving and
needy giving, and between religious and non-religious giving are negative for all the subsets
presented, and the bootstrapped (clustered) standard errors are fairly small. Most of the
correlations are significantly negative in a one-tailed test based on the empirically generated
(“bootstrapped”) distribution, particularly for larger givers and for those with characteristics
of large givers (a college degree and a high income).
Table 17 about here
6 Conclusion
My results show that expenditure substitution exists between certain sets of charities, but
that a cross-sectional approach will mask this; researchers need to focus on within-household
variation. The greater (more negative) substitution for large givers, particularly for health
versus basic needs giving has a plausible explanation. Small givers may be mainly driven
by temporary shocks and personal appeals; if they do not inherently value charitable giving,
their sensitivity to one shock may be unaffected by the receipt of another shock. On the
other hand, larger givers may be more committed to charitable giving, as they may have
multi-charity warm-glow preferences (or follow a Kantian model) and thus giving to a cause
such as medical research may partially fill this need for other-directed giving, leading to less
giving to causes like soup kitchens. My results do not contradict the notion that giving is a
learned behavior; the substitution does not occur at the extensive margin.
42The bootstrapped residuals presented in columns “with controls” are from similar fixed-effects linear
regressions (details by request); bootstrapping the Poisson regressions required too much computing time.
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There are numerous ways this research can be extended. More data will continue to be-
come available, allowing more precise tests and models with more sophisticated time patterns.
Macroeconomic data has the advantages of accuracy, salience, and lack of corner-solution
variables ; time-series analysis of such data may prove fruitful. It would also be useful to
get richer data that looks within the categories discussed here, to see, for example, whether
giving to one cause that supports the needy displaces giving to another similar cause. Fi-
nally, experimental evidence (e.g., [citation hidden]) should supplement econometric work
by offering truly exogenous shocks and precise measurement. A field experiment (in the
mold of (Frey and Meier, 2004)) taking advantage of employer-provided matching for spe-
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7 Appendix: Background
7.1 Model of sequential decisions
Imagine the consumer has three choices: own consumption x and her gifts (gA and gB) to
charities A and B. The giving decisions are made sequentially with any possible ordering, and
the consumption decision is made last.43 Consider the utility function U(x, gA, gB;µAit, µ
B
it),
where µAit and µ
B
it are temporary shocks that may occur only when the choices of gifts to
charities A and B (respectively) are made. If there are no shocks, she will choose the values
x∗, gA∗, and gB∗ that solve the program:
max
x,gA,gB
U(x, gA, gB; 0, 0) s.t. y = px+ gA + gB (1)
where y is the household income and p is the normalized price of the consumption good
(the prices of the charitable goods are assumed to be identical). Let the consumer face a
utility-shock µBit (e.g., a fundraising appeal) when she is choosing g
B, leading to a temporary
utility function U(x, gA, gB; 0, µBit). Hence, the choice g
B(µBit) may differ from g
B∗: she may







This choice imposes a constraint on later choices, as in the “preallocation” of the Pollak
(1969) model of conditional demand.44 With no other shocks she will maximize conditional
utility, solving :
43This assumption is made for simple exposition; I could allow a case where consumption is allocated first
and the charitable decisions necessarily trade off one-for-one; the general results would be preserved.
44For a more recent empirical application of this theory, see, e.g., PITT (1977.) on inter-household
allocation. Note that I focus on the effect of ξBon gA rather than on the effect of µB on gB . This is relevant
to the real world: a policymaker has no objective measure of µB ; instead he wants to predict the expenditure
substitution effect (on various categories of giving) as a function of the impact of the shock (e.g., a tsunami)




U(x, gA, gB(µBit); 0, 0) (3)
s.t. Y˜ = y − gB(µBit) = px+ gA
I label the difference between the choice after this shock and the long-term choice,
gA(ξBit )−gA∗, the “expenditure crowding-out” effect of B on A, and the derivative of the func-
tion gA(ξBit ) the “expenditure substitution [complementarity]” if negative [positive]. Since I
do not hold Y˜ (remaining income after the choice of gB) constant the effect includes both a
substitution effect and an income effect; similar to Pollak’s “pure substitution” and “money
expenditure” effects, respectively. In the rest of the paper I model the response as linear;
this will hold, for example, if utility is quadratic (derivation available by request). In any
case, the linear estimate can be interpreted as a first-order approximation. This specification
allows any of the crowding-out predictions (zero, partial, or complete) from the theoretical
models described in section 3.
Let Yit represent (a projection into one dimension of) the variables that enter into the
budget constraint; I will later drop this variable to ease notation. Utility functions are
heterogeneous: households may have different preferences over charities and different levels
of generosity. The net effect of these factors is given by the parameters CAi and C
B
i . There
may also be unobservable wealth and unobservable variables that affect utility: εAit and ε
B
it
represent the effect of these. Let “” denote time precedence. If gA is chosen before gB, a
shock to gA can affect the choice of gift to B but not vice versa; if gB  gA this is reversed.






















and of course, where gBit  gAit , we have the symmetric result (switching A and B).
Assumption 1 sign(βA) = sign(βB)
We expect expenditure substitution (complementarity) to be the same in both directions;
whether gBit  gAit or the reverse. In the next subsection I show that this property holds, at
least at the margin, using the properties of conditional demand.
Claim 1 E[(CAi − E(CAi )(CBi − E(C Bi )] > 0
Claim 2 E[(CAi − E(CAi |Yit)(CBi − E(C Bi |Yit))] > 0
I claim (1 and 2) that the effect of the household’s observable and unobservable time-
invariant variables (e.g., generosity, trust, and unobserved wealth) on gifts to each category
of charity are positively correlated. This will be seen empirically: the correlations in residuals
are more negative after controlling for a household-effect, whether or not we also control for
time-varying observables.
I assume (assumptions 2-4) that the shocks and error terms are mean-zero, the impact
of changes in the permanent utility function (especially changes in overall generosity) and in
the latent variables (especially changes in unobserved income) are positively correlated, and
the shocks to the temporary utility function are uncorrelated to each other, and uncorrelated
to the effects of unobservables:
Assumption 2 E[ξAit ] = E[ξ
B




it ] = 0
Assumption 3 E[ξAitξ
B




















it ] > 0






it )] > 0.
Thus, in net, if there were no expenditure substitution effect, there is a positive correlation
between the deviations from the predicted values of gA and gB, the composite disturbances;
result 1 is the fundamental econometric assumption.45
Assumption 5 The decisions are never simultaneous. The decision over gAit precedes the
decision over gBit some ω proportion of the time, and the determination of the decision-making
order is independent of any of the other stochastic variables:
Pr(gAit  gBit ) = ω and Pr(gBit  gAit) = (1− ω) where 0 < ω < 1.
E[1(gAit  gBit )|ξAit , ξBit , εAit, εBit ] = E[1(gAit  gBit )] = ω
where 1() is the indicator function.









it) + (1− 1AB)(βAξ¨Bit + ξ¨Ait + ε¨Ait) (5)
= ξ¨Ait + ε¨
A






B ξ¨Ait . (6)
Since the ordering of decisions is ambiguous and unknown, either a regression of g¨Ait on g¨
B
it
or the reverse regression will pick up effects in both directions. As a compromise,46 I estimate
the Pearson correlation coefficient between the estimated residuals from fixed-effects linear
regressions of each category of giving, which I label ρ¨A,B. Below, I decompose ρ¨A,B in terms




, σ2ε¨A , σ
2
ε¨B) and covariances (σ
2
εAεB) of
45Essentially, I rule out the possibility that variations that cause increased giving to A inherently tend to
coincide with variations that cause decreased giving to B.
46Note that the estimated correlation coefficient, r¨A,B , is necessarily bounded between βˆB and βˆA, the
estimated coefficients from forward and reverse regressions.
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If βB is positive, implying βA is positive by assumption 1, then all terms in the last line
of equation 7 are positive and hence the correlation coefficient is positive. Thus, a negative
correlation coefficient implies that βA and βB are negative:
























–where i = 1...N indexes households and t = 1...T indexes periods (3 years of data) –
is a consistent estimator of ρ¨A,B.
47 Thus, if I estimate a negative and significant r¨A,B, I can
infer that there is a high probability that charities A and B are expenditure substitutes.
There are several potential alternatives to the sequential-decision interpretation given
in this section. The shock could be seen as a temporary change in effective price (e.g., a
tsunami makes the cost of aiding a single disaster victim lower); this will be equivalent to a
proportional boost in marginal utility, hence it is not entirely distinct from the explanation
above. Alternately, the shock could be interpreted as the effect of a parameter of the utility
function that changes over time when decisions are made simultaneously, but it is difficult
47The equation looks simpler than usual because g¨Ait and g¨
B
it are mean-zero by construction.
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to justify the interpretation of any parameter as specific to one choice.
7.2 Shared sign of conditional demand effects
Adapting the Pollak (1969) model of conditional demand to our notation, the “total deriva-
tive” of the conditional demand for gA with respect to a change ξB in the preallocated good



























assuming the price of each charitable good is 1 (9)











if (g¯B = g
∗
B) (10)
Where f represents the Hicksian demand, Sij the i, j’th element of the Slutsky matrix,
and g∗n the unconditional demand for the n’th good. In Pollak’s statement, the derivative of
conditional demand for a good with respect to a binding ration constraint on another good,
evaluated at (i.e., when the constraint is originally set to) the unconstrained chosen amount,
will equal the ratio of the price derivatives of the Hicksian (utility-constant cost-minimizing)
demands. Since, if the ration is binding (before and after), the choice of rationed good
should change by the full amount of the change in the ration, this should be equivalent to
the case I consider, where the good gB is exogenously shifted or “preallocated” away from the
unconstrained optimum. Since SBB < 0 (the Slutsky matrix must be negative semi-definite)
the direction of the marginal change depends on SAB, i.e., whether the goods are Hicksian






48This is virtually identical to Pollak’s equation (4.10d), the derivative of the consumption of an unrationed




i ) we can see it must have the same sign, but may have a different magnitude.
7.3 Appendix: Literature review
Models of Giving
Notation:
i : indexes individuals
xi : Individual i’s non-charity consumption of the numeraire composite commodity (price
normalized to 1)
gi: i’s giving to the charitable or public good mi: i’s income
G =
∑N
i=1 gi + t: total giving or total supply of the public good
G˜i = G− gi: Giving by individuals other than i
pi : Price of a unit of giving to the charitable or public good
All models include some form of the following “standard” budget constraint:
xi + pigi −mi = 0; gi ≥ 0, xi ≥ 0; (11)
List I: Theoretical Models Single Charity/ Public Good
Name,Author, Year Utility Function
1. Pure Public Goods, Becker, 1974 u (x,G)
2. Pure Warm Glow (e.g., Andreoni, ‘04) u (x, gi)
3. Mixed warm glow, Becker, 1974 u (x,G˜i, gi)
4. Mixed warm glow (e.g., Andreoni, ‘04) u (x,G, gi)
5. Tithing gi = τmi; where τ ∈ (0, 1)
6. Kantian or individual/group- i chooses arg maxxi,gi ui (xi, ngi);
-misperception (e.g., Laffont, 1975) s.t. eqn. 11
but i gets actual utility ui (xi, G)
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List II: Multi-Charity Utility forms and Related Models
Name,Author, Year Utility/Expenditure Function
1. Andreoni et al. (‘04) U(x,m,wh, l) = U(Q) = α′Q− 1
2
Q′βQ
(Quadratic) m: $ gifts, w: imputed volunteer wage,
h : volunteer hours ; l: leisure
In empirical model: Q = (x,m,wh) (leisure not observed)
2. Andreoni et al. (’03) Ui = U(xi , g, θi(g1, g2)); i = h,w
“...by Married Couples...,” h: husband; wife;
g: marriage-specific public good
Considers extreme cases: θh = θw = d1; θh = d1, θw = d2;
θh = −θw = d1 − d2
3. Harbaugh’s (1998b) ui = ln(xi ) + b ln(pi(gi) + k1) + c ln(gi + k2)
(Stone-Geary) where pi(gi) = prestige, k’s: constants
4. Cobb-Douglas, mixed ui = α0 ln(xi ) + α′G˜ + β′g˜i





5. Leonteif, pure warm glow ui = min(αxi , β1gi1, β2gi2, ..., βKgiK)
6. Multi-Stage Budgeting U(qi...qj) = u(v1(q1...qJ1), vG(qJ1...qJ))
This table offers some related models from the literature (adapted to my notation –
discussed in section 2) as well as some proposed multi-charity models of my own. No previous
works offer a robust model of giving to multiple causes. Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall
(2003), (model 2, above) consider only extreme cases (in the context of couples’ decision-
making). Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz (1996), offer the most useful example, estimating a
model of giving and volunteering based on a quadratic utility form.49
49Their utility function could be extended to a model with a second charity (rather than volunteering).
However, it is easier for them to observe distinct prices of giving and volunteering then it is for me to observe
distinct prices for different charities. The quadratic form can be justified as a second-order approximation
of any utility. It includes linear and squared terms and interactions between the choice variables.
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7.4 Appendix: Data and summary statistics
Details on PSID data and its use
The COPPS web site offers the following description:
The Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) is the only study that
surveys giving and volunteering by the same households over time as families
mature, face differing economic circumstances and encounter changes in their
family size, health and other factors. It also is the only data available that asks
families extensively about their wealth and philanthropy as well as income and
other relevant factors ... This is conducted in conjunction with the ISR’s long-
running Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which has surveyed the same 5,000
households since 1966. As children of these respondents have matured, they
have been added to the sample which now exceeds 7,400 households. In 2001,
researchers added the philanthropy component, designed and sponsored by the
Center on Philanthropy. These first-round results represent the largest one-time
study of philanthropy in the United States that will be beneficial to donors,
funders, fundraisers and the nonprofit sector as the households’ behaviors are
tracked over time in the coming years.
My original data has 7662 household observations that appear in the 2000, 2002, and
2004 samples. I remove 2321 families that split or otherwise undergo a major change in
composition between the two years, leaving 5321 households, each of which has the same head
for all three years. To help ensure my result’s robustness (and remove possible miscodes),
for most analysis, I leave out (194, 193, and 195 for years 2000, 2000, and 2003 respectively)
“outliers” who either reported giving over $80,000 or over 30% of their income (if income
above $10,000), or reported a change in total giving between two years exceeding 30% of
their total income. This leaves me with 15,381 household/years. Of the 5127 non-outlier
households in 2000, 3479 are from the 1968 SRC cross-section sample, 1286 are from the
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1968 “Census” poor oversample, and 362 are from the 1997-98 immigrant sample. 3466
households in the 1968 SRC cross-section sample are not outliers in any of the three years.
For each category of charity, the respondent is first asked whether they donated to the
category and next asked the amount donated. If they do not give an exact value, they are
asked categorical questions (e.g., “was it $200 or more?”) in a prescribed order. For example,
questions on religious giving are presented first, and next they are asked “(Not counting the
donations you just told me about (during 2004),/During 2004) did you (or anyone in your
family) donate to any organization that served a combination of purposes? For example,
the United Way, the United Jewish Appeal, the Catholic Charities, or your local community
foundation?” Following a “yes” answer, the respondent is asked “ (Altogether,) what was
the total dollar value of all donations you (and your family) made in 2004 towards combined
purpose funds?” If a respondent is asked about a category and realizes that she should have
classified a previously mentioned gift in this category, the respondent is allowed to revise
her answer. The order and structure of the donation questions (about te categores I focus
on) are stable from year to year. Research by Wilhelm (2006) confirms the quality and
comparability of this data set.
All nominal variables are adjusted for inflation using the CPI-urban and reported in 2000
dollars.
Weights Although the PSID has introduced new data to deal with the changing compo-
sition of the US population, and provides sampling and weights intended to preserve balance
in the presence of attrition, the validity of these weights depends on several assumptions,
and the use of such weights in statistical analysis, particularly with an individual-level er-
ror term, is both difficult and controversial. I thus ignore these weights and accept that
my analysis is limited to a population that is not exactly representative of the current US
population.
Imputed Variables and Values
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When I encounter missing values or refusals, I leave these as missing. I avoid doing any
imputation because substitution results might be sensitive to the details of such a procedure.
In any case, these represent only a small portion of the data. A small subset of respondents
give only a range-coded value for contributions; I leave these out of my analysis as well.
Constructing an exogenous measure of the cost of giving and net income
In line with much of the recent literature, I use NBER’s Taxsim module to compute the
marginal cost of charitable giving – which is 1 for non-itemizers and 1 minus the marginal
tax rate for itemizers. Taxsim imputes both the marginal tax rate and itemization status
based on the rich variety of variables (some imputed) that I “feed” it.50 Taxsim’s imputation
is highly sophisticated, even differentiating states that allow and do not allow a charitable
deduction.
Following Auten et al. (2002) I compare the estimated tax bill with zero charitable
contributions and with a predicted (regressing on a standard set of presumed exogenous
covariates) level of giving and divide this difference by the predicted (rather than actual)
level of charitable giving in this computation.51 This (one minus the computation described)
yields a more precise estimate of an individual’s average tax-price of giving (than if I assumed
zero contributions and looked for first-dollar price), but it removes the endogeneity of the tax
rate and charitable contributions (as charitable contributions can shift the tax bracket and
decision to itemize). This simulation seems to slightly underestimate (even when using actual
giving rather than predicted zero giving) the number of people who itemize (comparing the
“but-for” itemization to their known itemization status). This suggests that unobserved
income and taxes may be important.
50For example, marital status and children are used to determine filing status (single, joint, head of house-
hold), while “married filing separate”, a fairly rare category, is unidentified and thus ignored. I incorporate
dividends, various types of capital gains, itemizable deductions (health care, etc) other than charitable giv-
ing, and many other variables. I solve for the the mortgage interest payment, a popular deduction, although
I ignore second and third mortgages, and approximate by assuming one payment a year.
51In looking for the impact of giving to charity A on giving to B we may or may not want to include the
extent to which increased giving to A reduces the price of giving to B – this depends on the policy question.
If we want to include this effect we should impute a tax price based on actual giving to A and only imputed
giving to B. I defer this issue for later study.
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7.5 Appendix: Further results
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Table 1: Pooled cross-section Poisson regressions for generating residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Religion Non-relig. Combo Needy Educ. Health Other
Log net incm 0.54** 0.46** 0.67** 0.77** 0.63** 0.75** 0.62** 0.55**
(0.073) (0.092) (0.071) (0.12) (0.079) (0.14) (0.082) (0.10)
Log price -1.137** -0.947* -1.527** -1.620** -1.594** -1.388+ -2.255** -1.100*
(0.323) (0.382) (0.332) (0.359) (0.407) (0.771) (0.563) (0.452)
Nonres wealth 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000* -0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Resl. wealth -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head is married 0.537** 0.894** -0.021 0.169 -0.150 -0.035 -0.340+ 0.036
(0.069) (0.095) (0.083) (0.117) (0.148) (0.207) (0.182) (0.149)
Age of head 0.053** 0.055** 0.055** 0.057** 0.058** 0.078* 0.037+ 0.057*
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020) (0.024)
... age squared -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kids 0.083** 0.119** 0.022 0.004 0.090* 0.031 -0.084 -0.005
(0.027) (0.035) (0.035) (0.071) (0.044) (0.070) (0.067) (0.058)
Year 2002 0.028 0.041 0.008 -0.090 0.123 0.074 -0.100 0.026
(0.026) (0.026) (0.053) (0.084) (0.079) (0.138) (0.155) (0.136)
Year 2004 0.067* 0.052 0.094+ -0.092 0.252** 0.180 -0.152 0.223
(0.028) (0.032) (0.053) (0.098) (0.087) (0.139) (0.143) (0.150)
Head col. deg. 0.282** 0.203* 0.457** 0.564** 0.260** 0.685** 0.386** 0.458**
(0.057) (0.082) (0.069) (0.102) (0.100) (0.213) (0.130) (0.122)
Wife col. deg. 0.195** 0.126 0.354** -0.026 0.327** 0.862** 0.483** 0.576**
(0.070) (0.094) (0.091) (0.178) (0.114) (0.205) (0.163) (0.147)
Constant -1.102 -0.812 -3.453** -5.724** -4.045** -7.524** -4.630** -4.272**
(0.777) (0.975) (0.774) (1.291) (0.863) (1.626) (1.000) (1.266)
Observations 10417 10417 10417 10417 10417 10417 10417 10417
Robust (clustered by household) standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
Giving outliers and households with changing composition removed; details in section 4.
Hidden controls: Religion, race.
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Table 2: Poisson fixed-effects (pseudo-ML) regressions for constructing residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Religion Non-relig. Combo Needy Educ. Health Other
Log net incm 0.19** 0.13* 0.24** 0.32** 0.23* 0.44** 0.21 -0.028
(0.048) (0.053) (0.079) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18)
Log price -0.555** -0.477** -0.668** -0.463 -0.693+ -1.294** -0.951+ -0.315
(0.124) (0.135) (0.213) (0.344) (0.364) (0.447) (0.547) (0.535)
Nonres. wealth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Resl. wealth -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kids -0.007 0.031 -0.072 -0.233** 0.078 -0.115 -0.016 0.067
(0.029) (0.029) (0.058) (0.084) (0.101) (0.150) (0.118) (0.139)
Year 2002 0.058* 0.070** 0.039 -0.077 0.122 0.075 -0.044 0.104
(0.023) (0.026) (0.045) (0.083) (0.080) (0.120) (0.130) (0.103)
Year 2004 0.164** 0.141** 0.201** -0.051 0.266** 0.245+ 0.054 0.489**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.049) (0.103) (0.094) (0.131) (0.107) (0.106)
Observations 8840 6515 8158 5498 5648 3227 4491 5303
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
Giving outliers and households with changing composition removed; details in section 4.
Groups with all zero outcomes dropped by estimation procedure; 10,420 obs in total.
Table 3: Correlations: residuals from Poisson FE regressions, large givers





Education 0.071 0.014 -0.078
(0.002) (0.535) (0.001)
Health -0.048 -0.084 -0.065 -0.045
(0.037) (0.000) (0.004) (0.050)
Other -0.077 -0.025 0.008 0.008 0.033
(0.001) (0.269) (0.733) (0.725) (0.153)
P-values (for standard 2-tailed tests of significance) in parentheses.
Giving outliers and households with changing composition removed: see section 4 for details.
Residuals derived from separate Poisson FE for each category, details in table 1.
Subset: household declared over $1000 in total contributions in 1998
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8 Tables for main text
Table 4: Models – predictions for net expenditure substitution
Model Net Substitution?
Shock/Appeal driven None
Public Goods (strict) Only within same category
‘Kantian’ model Only between similar categories
Warm Glow (sophisticated) ‘Anything goes’
Impact Philanthropy (concave) Depends on ‘impact’ of shocked gift
Tithing/Fixed Purse/Homogenous Good Complete (perfect crowding-out)
Table 5: Summary statistics: continuous control variables
Mean S.D. P10 Median P90 Min. Max.
Net income 52,267 76,317 14,001 40,241 91,052 47 4,445,506
Bonus income 1,339 14,664 0 0 83 0 549,737
Tax-price of giving.89 .14 .68 1 1 .51 1
Wealth w/o house 207,407 1,034,313 -2,781 32,817 445,000 -429,361 42,208,000
Wealth w/ house 296,095 1,102,528 0 94,317 639,674 -278,948 43,008,000
Head’s Age 49 16 29 47 72 17 99
Wife’s Age 45 14 28 45 64 18 92
Number of Children .73 1 0 0 2 0 6
(in household)
10420 observations, 3485 households.
Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
Households with changing composition or giving outliers removed
All monetary figures adjusted to year-2000 dollars based on the urban CPI.
See section 4 for details.
P10 and P90 refer to quantiles.
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Table 6: Dummy: gave to (category of) charity
Variable Mean
Anything over $25 0.73







Notes: Pooled data (2000-2004), SRC sample, 10420 obs., unweighted.
Giving outliers & households with changing composition removed:
details in section 4.
Table 7: Summary statistics: Charitable giving
Mean Mean positive Sd Med p75 p90 Max
Total 1,387 1,937 2,958 400 1,500 3,889 76,800
Religion 865 1,765 2,103 0 729 2,735 65,000
Non-relig. 522 854 1,616 96 469 1,200 45,762
Combination 152 471 709 0 89 365 38,824
Needy 134 431 538 0 50 306 15,000
Education 70 395 523 0 0 96 27,348
Health 57 233 384 0 0 100 20,000
Other 109 375 585 0 29 212 26,500
Pooled data (2000-2004), SRC sample, 10420 obs., unweighted.
All figures adjusted to year-2000 dollars based on the urban CPI.
Giving outliers & households with changing composition removed; details in sec. 4.
P75 and P90 refer to quantiles, Mean positive refers to mean of positive gifts.
Table 8: Number of major categories given to in a year









Pooled data (2000-2004), SRC sample, unweighted.
Giving outliers & households with changing composition removed:
see section 4 for details.
40
Table 9: Correlations between charitable gifts in cross-section






Education 0.186 0.259 0.118
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Health 0.172 0.117 0.186 0.195
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other 0.143 0.143 0.179 0.167 0.279
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P-values (for standard 2-tailed tests of significance) in parentheses.
Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
Giving outliers and households with changing composition removed: see section 4 for details.
Table 10: Correlations: residuals from Poisson regressions





Education 0.151 0.135 0.075
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Health 0.128 0.025 0.131 0.143
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)
Other 0.091 0.075 0.125 0.155 0.202
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P-values (for standard 2-tailed tests of significance) in parentheses.
Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
Giving outliers and households with changing composition removed: see section 4 for details.
Residuals derived from separate Poisson regressions for each category, details in table 1.
41
Table 11: Correlations: de-meaned giving variables






Education 0.029 0.125 -0.004
(0.003) (0.000) (0.685)
Health -0.022 -0.046 -0.035 -0.010
(0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.309)
Other -0.042 -0.013 0.011 0.023 0.066
(0.000) (0.180) (0.280) (0.021) (0.000)
P-values (for standard 2-tailed tests of significance) in parentheses.
Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
Giving outliers & households with changing composition removed:
... see section 4 for details.
Table 12: Correlations: residuals from Poisson FE regressions





Education 0.052 0.025 -0.023
(0.000) (0.010) (0.022)
Health -0.043 -0.068 -0.039 -0.025
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012)
Other -0.059 -0.027 -0.012 0.021 0.049
(0.000) (0.006) (0.227) (0.034) (0.000)
Residuals derived from separate Poisson FE regressions for each category, details in table 2.
P-values (for standard 2-tailed tests of significance) in parentheses.
Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
Giving outliers and households with changing composition removed: details in section 4.
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Table 13: Correlations between residuals: robustness
Description Obs. Educ. × Combo. Health × Needy
a. Within correlations without controls 10,420 0.125 -0.035
(0.00) (0.00)
b. Within correlations with controls 10,420 0.025 -0.039
(0.010) (0.00)
c. As in b, with Support Others control 10,420 0.031 -0.037
(0.00) (0.00)
d. As in b, re-including giving outliers. 10,764 0.078 -0.113
(0.00) (0.00)
e. As in b, household gave to at least one 2433; 3344 0.032 -0.056
category in the pair in some year. (0.11) (0.001)
f. As in b, household gave to both 240; 299 0.204 -0.145
categories in the pair in all years. (0.00) (0.01)
g. As in b, ”large givers”; 2185 0.039 -0.070
(declared over $1k total in 1998) (0.07) (0.00)
h. As in b, controlling for all gifts, 10,420 0.026 -0.040
(i.e., partial correlations) (0.01) (0.00)
Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
P-values (for standard 2-tailed tests of significance) in parentheses.
Giving outliers and households with changing composition removed except where mentioned.
Residuals for rows b, e-h derived from Poisson-FE regression in table 2.
Separate Poisson-FE regressions for rows c and d; details by request.
Table 14: Bivariate Correlations in “Within” Residuals: Sums of Categories
All (non-outliers) Small givers Large givers
Religion versus All Else -0.048 0.079 -0.102
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Needy versus [Education + Health] -0.042 0.053 -0.086
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Health versus [Education + Needy] -0.048 0.032 -0.077
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Education versus [Health + Needy] -0.037 0.051 -0.070
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Bivariate correlation coefficients between residuals from separate fixed-effects Poisson regressions.
P-values in parentheses.
Pooled data (2000-2004), SRC sample, unweighted.
Giving outliers and households with changing composition removed: see section 4 for details.
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Table 15: Extensive margin results; tabulating state changes
Stopped or started giving to the category:
Health Education
Needy Stopped Started Combined Stopped Started
Stopped 207 135 Stopped 158 115
Expected 162 180 Expected 125 148
Started 128 237 Started 83 172
Expected 173 192 Expected 116 139
Nonparametric measures of positive association
Health × Needy Education × Needy
Γ K’s τ -b Γ K’s τ -b
0.48 0.25 0.48 0.25
(0.06) (0.04) 0.07 0.04
Zeroes removed, asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Γ refers to Goodman and Kruskal’s measure (1979).
K’s τ -b refers to Kendall’s (1938) measure of rank correlation.
Giving outliers & households with changing composition removed: details in section 4.
Table 16: Correlations: Eating out expense and charity; de-meaned with and
without controls
De-meaned Residuals from Poisson FE regressions [*]















Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
Giving outliers & households with changing composition removed:
see section 4 for details.
[*] Residuals from separate regressions for each category (including eating out) as in table 2.
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Table 17: Correlation between de-meaned (and residuals of) gifts, bootstrap stan-
dard errors
Subset Correlations in de-meaned contributions
Obs. Health ... with controls Educ+Health ...w. ctrls. Relig. ... w. ctrls.
× Needy × Needy × Non-rel.
All givers
10,420 -.044 -.062+ -.035 -.046 -.039 -.043
(.052) (.047) (.048) (.039) (.047) (.050)
Gave over 500 in 1999
2904 -.068 -.097* -.069* -.084** -.076 -.086
(.045) (.060) (.038) (.048) (.059) (.063)
Gave over 1000 in 1999
2166 -.073+ -.105* -.080* -.095* -.113* -.124*
(.058) (.069) (.049) (.055) (.062) (.060)
Gave over 1500 in 1999
1878 -.075 -.110* -.086* -.105** -.117* -.125*
(.064) (.071) (.046) (.056) (.064) (.060)
Gave over 1000 in 1999 and gross income above 50k and hd. coll. degree
943 -.109+ -.138* -.110* -.129** -.181* -.187**
(.094) (.081) (.070) (.065) (.080) (.062)
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 from empirical bootstrapped distributions, one-tailed tests
Bootstrapped std errors (100 replications, clustering by household) in parentheses.
Regression residuals generated separately for each bootstrap replication.
Pooled data (2000-2004), 1968 cross-scn sample (SRC), unweighted.
Households with changing composition or giving outliers removed.
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